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I. INTRODUCTION

In West Virginia, a written agreement that expresses the intent of the
parties in "plain and unambiguous language" is not subject to judicial
construction or interpretation, but will be strictly applied as a matter of law.'
Of course, instruments that express the parties' intent in plain and unambiguous
language are rarely litigated. Rather, it is the vague, incomplete, or inconsistent
term that usually gives rise to conflict. The purpose of this Article is to describe
the methodology West Virginia courts use to resolve such ambiguity in
contracts, deeds, leases, and other written agreements. This Article is not
intended to serve as a comprehensive survey of the law on this expansive topic,
though the author hopes to provide the reader with a summary of the "rules"
regarding the interpretation of ambiguity, as well as a brief discussion of the
most pertinent jurisdictional cases related to each of those rules.
Section II of this Article addresses the question of what constitutes
ambiguity within written agreements. Section III describes three recent cases in
which the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia applied the terms of
unambiguous written agreements. Section IV provides two examples in which
the court used extrinsic evidence to help supplement or complete ambiguous
terms as matters of law, rather than fact. Section V describes two cases in
which the responsibility for resolving ambiguous terms in a written agreement
was delegated to a jury for resolution as a matter of fact, rather than law. This
Article concludes with a summary of the case law discussed in Sections II
through V.
II. CONFUSING THE EDUCATED AND FRUSTRATING THE UNLEARNED: WHAT IS
AMBIGUITY?

Generally, when a disputed written agreement is deemed "ambiguous,"
it is interpreted by a judge or a jury, usually with the aid of extrinsic evidence,
I
See, e.g., Orteza v. Monongalia Cnty. Gen. Hosp., 318 S.E.2d 40, 43 (W. Va. 1984)
(quoting Syl. Pt. 2, Bethlehem Mines Corp. v. Haden, 172 S.E.2d 126, 126 (W. Va. 1969))
("Where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be applied and not
construed."); see also Syl. Pt. 3, Cotiga Dev. Co. v. United Fuel Gas Co., 128 S.E.2d 626, 628
(W. Va. 1962) ("It is not the right or province of a court to alter, pervert or destroy the clear
meaning and intent of the parties as expressed in unambiguous language in their written contract
or to make a new or different contract for them.").
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and enforced in accordance with the parties' intent.2 When extrinsic or parol
evidence contradicts an ambiguous writing, questions of fact are raised and
should be submitted to a jury. When, on the other hand, extrinsic evidence
merely clarifies or completes the disputed terms of an ambiguous contract, the
question of what the parties intended to agree to remains a question of law for
the court.4 Not surprisingly, if the court determines that the agreement in
question is unambiguous, it will apply the agreement without reviewing any
extrinsic evidence.
Because the outcome of so many contract disputes turns on the
admission or exclusion of extrinsic evidence, the question of whether a contract
is "ambiguous" is often a zealously contested one. But what is ambiguity? The
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has repeatedly held that an
agreement "is considered ambiguous where [its] terms are inconsistent on their
face or where the phraseology can support reasonable differences of opinion as
to the meaning of words employed and obligations undertaken." 5
Generally, ambiguity can be categorized as "patent" or "latent." Patent
ambiguity is apparent on the face of an instrument to anyone reviewing it, even
if the reviewer is unfamiliar with the circumstances of the parties.6 A typo in
which a parenthetical numeral differs from the associated written number is
perhaps the simplest example of a patent ambiguity, such as "Grantor does
hereby convey one-hundred and ten (110) acres of coal to Grantee." As a
general rule, courts do not resort to parol evidence to resolve such ambiguities.
Although the jurisdictional case law involving patent ambiguity is sparse, the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has contradicted 8 and disregarded'
the general rule by allowing the admission of parol evidence. To date, the court
has declined to set a standard regarding the admission of parol evidence to
resolve patent ambiguities, and it is unlikely to do so going forward, given the
low volume of litigation involving that type of ambiguity.
Latent ambiguities, in contrast, are frequently alleged and often
vigorously contested. A latent ambiguity results "when the instrument upon its
2

See Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 144 (W. Va. 2003).
See Stewart v. Blackwood Elec. Steel Corp., 130 S.E. 447, 449 (W. Va. 1925).

4

Id. at 450.

City Holding Co. v. Kaufman, 609 S.E.2d 855, 859-60 (W. Va. 2004) (noting that
ambiguity in a statute or other instrument consists of susceptibility of two or more meanings and
uncertainty as to which was intended; mere informality in phraseology or clumsiness of
expression does not make it ambiguous if the language imports one meaning or intention with
reasonable certainty).
6
See Allegheny Int'l v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 40 F.3d 1416, 1424 (3d Cir. 1994).
7

See Devendorf v. W. Va. Oil & Oil Land Co., 17 W. Va. 135, 153 (1880).
See Knowlton v. Campbell, 37 S.E. 581, 582 (W. Va. 1900).
See Devendorf 17 W. Va. at 154-55.
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face appears to be clear and unambi Vous, but there is some collateral matter
which makes the meaning uncertain." In determining whether an instrument is
latently ambiguous, courts will assess the "everyday meaning" of the words it
contains." Hyper-technical, esoteric definitions are ignored, as parties to a
contract "are not expected to be wordsmiths, schooled in the craft of
lexicology. . . because the law disfavors the employment of arcane[,] subtle
definitions of common words which but promise to confuse even the educated
and frustrate the unlearned."1 2
Energy Development Corp. v. Moss' 3 presents one example of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia's approach to determining whether
a latent ambiguity existed in a contract. In 1986, Hall Mining Company (Hall)
leased oil and gas to Energy Development Corporation (EDC). 14 The disputed
lease conveyed to EDC the right to develop
all of the oil and gas and all of the constituents of either in and
under the land hereinafter described in all possible productive
formation therein and thereunder within the definition and
meaning of the term "shallow well" as set forth and defined in
[the West Virginia Code].15
The lease included no explicit reference to coalbed methane (CBM)
development rights, and EDC had not engaged in CBM development at the
time the lease was signed.16
Hall subsequently sold the right to extract CBM from the property in
question to GeoMet, Inc. in 2001.17 EDC sued Hall stating that the term "all oil
and gas" included the right to extract CBM.18 A bench trial took place in the
Circuit Court of McDowell County, during which EDC argued that "the broad,
'all gas' language in the 1986 [deed] conveyed to it the right to develop the
coalbed methane ... .19

10
Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 144 (W. Va. 2003) (citing Collins
v. Treat,
155 S.E. 205, 206 (W. Va. 1930)).
"
See Payne v. Weston, 466 S.E.2d 161, 171 n.7 (W. Va. 1995).
12

Id.

591 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va. 2003).
Id. at 139.
1s
Id.; see also W. VA. CODE § 22C-8-2(21) (1994) (defining "shallow well" as "any gas well
drilled and completed in a formation above the top of the uppermost member of the 'Onondaga
Group'").
16
See Energy Dev. Corp., 591 S.E.2d at 139.
1s
Id.
18
Id.
13
14

19

Id at 141.
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The circuit court disagreed, deemed the lease ambiguous, and denied
EDC's request for summary judgment.2 0 On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding that,
because CBM was rarely extracted or sold at the time the 1986 lease was
executed, it was possible that neither party contemplated the transfer of CBM
as part of the leasehold estate conveyed in that instrument. 21 The lease, the
court held, was therefore latently ambiguous,2 2 and raised a question of fact to
be resolved by the jury with the aid of extrinsic evidence.23
III. WHEN A WRITTEN AGREEMENT IS PLAIN AND CLEAR: "NIMBLE MENTAL
GYMNASTICS" WILL NOT CREATE ARTIFICIAL AMBIGUITY

Where an integrated agreement's terms are unambiguous, "there can be
no doubt that it is for a trial court ... to construe the contract according to its
plain meaning."24 Courts do not interpret or reconstruct unambiguous written
agreements. Rather, they are strictl' applied in accordance with the terms to
which the parties mutually agreed. 5 Following are three examples in which
written agreements were deemed unambiguous and enforced according to their
terms.

Id. at 140-41.
Id. at 141 (affirming the lower court's assertion that "[a]n oil and gas lease entered into
before any commercial coalbed methane wells had been permitted and drilled in West Virginia
and before West Virginia law contemplated coalbed methane development which leased to the
lessee 'all oil and gas' does not unambiguously grant the lessee the right to drill into the lessor's
coal seams to produce coalbed methane").
22
Id. at 140 (noting that an agreement will be interpreted and construed as of the date of its
execution). Though EDC claimed to have contemplated the possibility of extracting CBM from
Hall's land, the circuit court made a specific finding that it regarded EDC's testimony on the
matter "unreliable." EDC's president claimed to have traveled to the home of the original lessor
to discuss the CBM issue; he could not remember any of the details of his visit, despite the fact
that the lessor's home was "memorably located 300 yards from the road, through a gate, across a
creek, high on a hill, and stuffed with the [lessor's] glass collection." Id.
23
Id. at 145.
24
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Fairmont, 468 S.E.2d 712, 715 (W. Va. 1996).
25
Supervalu Operations, Inc. v. Ctr. Design, Inc., 524 S.E.2d 666, 670 (W. Va. 1999) (citing
Bennet v. Dove, 277 S.E.2d 617, 619 (W. Va. 1981)) ("It is the safest and best mode of
construction to give words, free from ambiguity, their plain and ordinary meaning.").
20
21
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[Vol. 1 16

Brewer v. Hospital Management Associates, Inc.: Context Modifies the
Term "Liability"
In Brewer v. Hospital Management Associates, Inc.,26 the Supreme

Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered a case in which the plaintiff, Ms.
Brewer, gave birth at Williams Memorial Hospital in 1975.27 Brewer claimed
that the hospital's negligence in providing neonatal care resulted in severe brain
damage to her son, 2 8 though she did not file suit until 1994.29 In 1978, three
years after the alleged medical malpractice occurred, Williams Memorial was
purchased by defendant Hospital Management Associates, Inc. (HMA).3 o
The contract for the sale of the hospital obligated HMA to assume "all
accounts payable and other liabilities of Hospital, represented to be in the
approximate amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars . . . ." 1 Brewer
claimed that HMA's assumption of "accounts payable and other liabilities"
included medical malpractice claims. 32 HMA countered that the terms of the
contract limited HMA's liability to financial, rather than legal, affairs.33 HMA
argued that if it had intended to assume liability for medical malpractice claims,
the agreement would have explicitly placed that burden on HMA.3 4
The court sided with HMA, finding that the phrase "other liabilities"
was modified by "in the ... amount of One Hundred Thousand Dollars." 5
Brewer, in fact, conceded that her claim did not fall into the "One Hundred
Thousand Dollars" category. The court therefore concluded the contract for
the sale of the hospital did not transfer legal liability to HMA for medical
malpractice that occurred before the 1978 purchase, and Brewer's claim against
HMA was dismissed.

26

503 S.E.2d 17 (W. Va. 1998) (per curiam).

27

Id. at 18.

28

Id

29

Id at 19.
Id at 18.
Id
Id at 19 (emphasis added).

30
31
32

33

Id

3
Id ("HMA counters that the contract specifically designated every liability it would incur
from the purchase. Such designation did not include the liability asserted by the Brewers.").
3
Id. ("[T]he specific clause at issue . . . [includes] two liabilities: accounts payable and
liabilities represented to be in the amount of about one hundred thousand dollars.").
36

Id

3
Id. at 19-20 (application of the terms of the liability clause precludes assumption of the
liability asserted).
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Bass v. Coltelli-Rose: Case Law and Black's Law DictionaryModify
the Term "Liability"

In September 1990, Douglas Bass, a minor and a passenger in a car
driven by Douglas Weakley, was injured when Weakley's car was struck by a
vehicle driven by Cary Dunham.38 Mabel Bass, Douglas's mother, retained
Laura Coltelli-Rose (Rose) to act as Douglas's attorney.39 Mrs. Bass signed an
"Authority to Represent" agreement, which authorized Rose to represent
Douglas in claims against "Cary Dunham, or whoever is liable for my son,
Douglas Bass'[s] injuries or damages resulting from an accident or incident
which occurred on or about September 30, 1990[,] at Berkeley County, WV."40
The agreement provided Rose with a one-third contingency fee, specifying that
"the fee will be calculated on the entire amount of the recovery (settlement or
verdict)."4 1
Rose successfully represented Bass, recovering monies from the
following sources: $25,000 from Weakley's State Farm Insurance policy (from
which Rose deducted her $8,333 contingency fee); $200,000 from Dunham's
liability insurance carrier (from which Rose deducted $60,000); and $21,666
from Mrs. Bass's own insurance carrier (from which Rose deducted $7,22 1).42
Mrs. Bass, unhappy with Rose's deductions, retained another attorney who
"subsequently demanded that Rose refund the one-third contingent fee she took
from the $25,000 medical payment benefit on the Weakley vehicle."4 3 At the
suggestion of the West Virginia State Bar, Rose voluntarily reduced her onethird contingency fee on Weakley's $25,000 medical payment benefit to onefourth."
Mrs. Bass was not satisfied. She filed suit against Rose in the Circuit
Court of Berkeley County, demanding a full refund on the $21,666 payment
received from her insurance carrier, as well as a full refund on the Weakley
payment. 4 5 Bass argued that the term "persons liable" contained in the
Authority to Represent covered only wrongdoers responsible for Douglas's
injuries and that the insurance payouts from Weakley's and Bass's insurance
carriers did not qualify as payments from "persons liable." 46 The circuit court

38

Bass v. Coltelli-Rose, 536 S.E.2d 494, 495 (W. Va. 2000) (per curiam).

39

Id.

40

Id. (emphasis added).

41

Id.

42

Id. at 495-96.

43

Id. at 496.

4

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id. at 497.
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granted summary judgment to Bass, finding the unambiguous agreement "did
not cover ... any mon[ies] which would be payable under any contract of
insurance, except insurance carried by [Dunham] ....
A divided Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reversed the
circuit court's summary judgment order.48 The majority declined to limit
Rose's right to collect contingency fees to "recoveries obtained from thirdparty tortfeasors."4 9 Rather, the court read "the plain wording of the provision
in question to encompass any recovery securedfrom a party who is legally
obligated to compensate Douglas Bass for the losses occasioned by [the

accident]."
The majority's decision turned on the definition of the word "liable" as
used in the phrase "whoever is liable for injuries or damages resulting from
[the] accident." 5 "[L]iable," the majority wrote, "has expansive meaning,
which encompasses a party being 'bound or obliged in law or equity';
'responsible, answerable, or compellable to make satisfaction, compensation, or
restitution' . . . or 'chargeable with, as liable for money."' 5 2 Under this broad
reading of "liable," Rose was entitled to contingency fees on payments from
Bass's and Weakley's insurance carriers, in addition to payments from
tortfeasors."
Justice Robin J. Davis, dissenting in part, admonished the majority for
implementing an archaic and all-encompassing definition of the word "liable,"
asserting that "ambiguity existed as to whether the contract permitted the
recovery of... [contin ency fees] from medical payments obtained from the
Basses' own insurer."5 Justice Davis declined to focus solely on the word
"liable," citing the modifying language in the "Authority to Represent"
agreement." "The controlling language," she wrote, "is 'liable for. . . injuries
or damages resulting from [the] accident."' 56 Such language did not necessarily
encompass payments from "friendly" insurance carriers such as those that
provided coverage to Weakley and Bass. 7 Thus, according to Justice Davis's

47
48
49

Id. at 496.
Id. at 498.
Id.

so

Id. (emphasis added).
51
Id. at 497.
52
Id. (citing Wilhelm v. Parkersburg, M. & 1. Ry. Co., 82 S.E. 1089, 1091 (W. Va. 1914)
(citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 915 (6th ed. 1990))).
5
Id. at 498.
5
Id. at 499 (Davis, J., dissenting in part).
56

Id
Id

57

Id

55
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dissent, the language of the contract was ambiguous, and "[i]t is also well
settled that any ambiguity in a contract must be resolved against the party who
prepared it."58
Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Fairmont: "Nimble Mental
Gymnastics" Do Not Change the Meaning of the Term "PerYear"

C.

Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Fairmont9 presents a third and
equally straightforward example of the court reviewing and strictly applying
the terms of an unambiguous contract. In 1992, a collective bargaining unit
(Fraternal Order of Police) negotiated a wage increase for its constituent police
officers with the City of Fairmont (Fairmont).60 The written "Wage and Benefit
Agreement" was executed by both parties on June 24, 1992, and called for a
"4% per year wage increase, effective the first day of the fiscal year beginning
immediately after execution of this agreement." 61 The agreement covered fiscal
years 1992 and 1993.62
The meaning of the term "a 4% per year wage increase" was called into
question when Fairmont provided a wage increase for only one of the two fiscal
years covered by the agreement.6 3 The Fraternal Order of Police filed suit
against Fairmont, stating that the term "a 4% per year wage increase" was
"clear and unambiguous," calling for a four percent wage increase for each of
the two years that the contract covered.6 Fairmont countered that the term "a
4% per year wage increase" should be interpreted in such a way that only one
raise was actually promised during the two-year life of the contract,65 noting
that "the indefinite article 'a' precedes a singular noun (i.e., a wage increase),
rather than a plural noun (e.g., wage increases)."66 Fairmont argued that this
ambiguity raised questions of fact that should be submitted to a jury to decide
with the aid of extrinsic evidence.67

58

Id. (citing Nisbet v. Watson, 251 S.E.2d 744, 780 (W. Va. 1979)).

59

468 S.E.2d 712 (W. Va. 1996).

Id. at 714.
Id. (emphasis added).
62
Id. (the agreement took effect on July 1, 1992, and expired on June 30, 1994; it is the
author's assumption that these dates represent the fiscal years 1992 and 1993).
63
Id.
6

61

64

Id. at 714-16.

65

Id. at 717.

6

Id.

67

Id.
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The Circuit Court of Marion County deemed the contract ambiguous
and sent the matter to a jury for resolution.6 8 The jury returned and the trial
court entered a verdict in favor of Fairmont.6 9 The Fraternal Order of Police
appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which reviewed
the case under the "clearly erroneous" standard.70
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia discarded Fairmont's
"artful" assertion that the term "a 4% per year wage increase" gave rise to
ambiguity. While noting that Fairmont's "mental gymnastics [were] indeed
nimble," the court refused to read any ambiguity into the agreement's plain
language. 72 The court referenced the Black's Law Dictionary definition of the
term "per year," which reads "the phrase 'per year' in a contract is the
equivalent to the word 'annually.' 7 3 The terms "per year" and "annually"
mean "by the year." 74 Thus, the court held that "the only reasonable
interpretation of the disputed language we can conceive is that the contract
provided for a 4% wage increase in each and every year of the contract." 7 5 In
short, the court refused to interpret the contract at all, opting instead to apply its
plain and unambiguous language.
IV. AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS: WHEN THE EVIDENCE SUPPLEMENTS OR
COMPLETES A WRITTEN AGREEMENT, INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTIES'
INTENT IS A MATTER OF LAW FOR THE COURT TO DETERMINE

Where the terms contained in an ambiguous contract are clarified or
supplemented by parol evidence, the court will admit parol evidence and use it
as an aid in resolving the agreement's ambiguous terms as a matter of law.n

68

Id. at 714.

69

Id.
Id. at 715 ("When a trial court's answers rest not on plain meaning but on differential
findings by a trier of fact, derived from extrinsic evidence as to the parties' intent with regard to
an uncertain contractual provision, appellate review proceeds under the 'clearly erroneous
standard."').
71 Id. at 718 ("[Defendant's] argument has the shrill ring of desperation.").
72
Id
70

73

Id. at 717 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (6th ed. 1990)).

74

Id

75

Id.

Id. at 718 ("The agreement is clear, and lengthy judicial proceedings [will] not make it any
clearer.").
77
See Stewart v. Blackwood Elec. Steel Corp., 130 S.E. 447, 449 (W. Va. 1925) ("[W]here
the written contract is ambiguous and uncertain, parol evidence is admissible .... [Where] the
parol evidence be not in conflict, the duty remains with the court to construe the writing;
otherwise, it becomes a jury question under proper instructions.") (referencing Watson v.
76
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The interpretation of ambiguous contracts is, not surprisingly, usually far more
contentious than the strict application of the terms of unambiguous contracts.
Here, the court must determine that ambiguity exists (often a controversial
issue in and of itself) before admitting extrinsic evidence to determine what
terms the parties agreed to when the contract was executed. The following
cases provide examples of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
using extrinsic evidence to interpret ambiguous terms contained in a written
agreement.
A.

Jessee v. Aycoth: The Absence ofMaterial Terms Constitutes
Ambiguity

In Jessee v. Aycoth, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
considered a case in which a couple had agreed, as part of their divorce
settlement, to sell their house, but did not set a deadline for the sale of that
property. 78 After the former couple's oldest child left the residence, the exhusband (Aycoth) contacted his ex-wife (Jessee) to encourage her to sell the
home.7 9 She took no action, and Aycoth petitioned the Mercer County Circuit
Court to order her to sell the residence.80 The circuit court deemed the divorce
settlement ambiguous, concluding, "[N]othing in the agreement precluded the
marital residence from being sold upon the child reaching 18 years of age."8 1
The circuit court then ordered Jessee to place the residence on the market for
sale. 82
Jessee appealed the order, arguing that the absence of an agreement to
sell the residence on a particular date or upon the occurrence of a particular
event did not constitute ambiguity. In reviewing Jessee's appeal, the Supreme
Buckhannon River Coal Co., 120 S.E. 390 (W. Va. 1923)); see also Fraternal Order of Police v.
City of Fairmont, 468 S.E.2d 712, 716 n.7, 717 (W. Va. 1996) (concluding that when ambiguity
exists in a contract, resolution will turn on the parties' intent).
78
See Jessee v. Aycoth, 503 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1998). The agreement stated in pertinent
part that the
[Ex-wife] shall retain and keep possession of the residential premises of the
parties .

. .

. [Ex-husband] shall pay all taxes, mortgage payments, or loss or

casualty insurance premiums, upon said residence.. . . [Ex-wife] shall have
the sole right to market and agree to the sale of said residential premises . ...
[A]t closing, the parties shall divide and receive equal shares of the equity in
said residential premises.
Id. at 530.

7

Id.

80

Id.

SId.
82

83

at 531.
Id
Id. at 530.
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Court of Appeals of West Virginia reiterated its assertion that "[a]mbiguity in a
statute or other instrument consists of susceptibility of two or more meanings
and uncertainty as to which was intended. Mere informality in phraseology or
clumsiness of expression does not make it ambiguous, if the language imports
one meaning or intention with reasonable certainty." 84 Under this standard, the
court found that the Aycoth-Jessee settlement agreement was clear and
unambiguous as to how profits from the sale of the residence would be split;
however, for reasons it declined to explain, the court concluded that the
agreement's silence as to when the residence would be sold resulted in
ambiguity.85 Because the agreement was ambiguous, the court allowed for the
admission of parol evidence to determine the parties' intent regarding the date
or time of sale. Without identifying any specific parol evidence that indicated
the parties intended to sell the residence when their oldest child reached
eighteen years of age, the court affirmed the circuit court's order to sell.
In a strong dissent, Justice Margaret L. Workman asserted that the
divorce settlement was not in any way ambiguous, and should not have been
altered by the court. While the circuit court was correct in finding the
agreement did not preclude the sale of the residence when the couple's oldest
child reached eighteen, Justice Workman stated, "nothing in the agreement
mandated the sale of the marital residence upon the child's majority." Justice
Workman admonished the court for finding ambiguity "in order to render what
the court believed to be a fairer result."90 After conceding that the ultimate
result may have been more equitable, Justice Workman stated that "[b]oth of
these parties were represented by lawyers in the negotiation of this agreement,"
and if Aycoth intended for the home to be sold upon the occurrence of a
particular event, his attorney should have ensured that the agreement reflected
this intent. 9' "Courts," Justice Workman concluded, "should not be in the
clean-up business for lawyers."9 2

8

85
86

Id. at 531 (quoting Syl. Pt. 13, State v. Harden, 58 S.E. 715 (W. Va. 1907)).
Id
Id.

Id. at 532.
Id. at 533 (Workman, J., dissenting).
89
Id (emphasis in original) (noting that the settlement agreement gave Jessee the sole right to
place the home on the market).
87
88

90

Id.

91

Id

92

Id
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In re Joseph G.: Equity Plays a Significant Role in Resolving
Ambiguity Containedin a Written Agreement
In In re Joseph G.," the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia

used extrinsic evidence to interpret, as a matter of law, the ambiguous terms
contained in a health care provision contract. Here, defendant West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) contracted with plaintiff
Stepping Stone, Inc. (Stepping Stone), a non-profit residential child care
facility, to provide health care for Joseph G.94 Under the terms of the initial
agreement (Agreement I), DHHR was obligated to pay Stepping Stone for
Joseph G.'s per diem expenses (i.e., for room and board) and all health care
services.95 In November 2001, Joseph G. reached adulthood, and his eligibility
for health care expenses expired. 6 His counsel, however, successfully moved
for a waiver of the State's independent living a e requirement, and Joseph G.
remained at Stepping Stone until April 17, 2002. While both parties agreed in
writing (Agreement II) that after November 1, 2001, Joseph G.'s per diem
expenses would be reimbursed by DHHR, neither DHHR nor Stepping Stone
proposed a means of providing for Joseph G.'s health care expenses incurred
between November 1, 2001, and April 17, 2002.98 During that time, $4,085 in
health care expenses were incurred on Joseph G.'s behalf.99
DHHR argued that Agreement II's silence on the issue of health care
costs "plain[ly] and easily" indicated that Stepping Stone assumed
responsibility for paying such expenses.' 00 Agreement II stated that it "contains
all the terms and provisions relating to the subject matter hereof and there are
no other understandings, oral or otherwise.""o" Thus, according to DHHR,
Agreement II should have been strictly applied rather than construed by the
court.102 Stepping Stone, in contrast, argued that Agreement II was ambiguous
and that Agreement II's silence on the question of Joseph G.'s health care
expenses did not equate to Stepping Stone's consent to pay those expenses.lo0

9

589 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 2003).

94

Id. at 509.
Id
Id.
Id. at 510.

95
96

97

99

Id
Id.

'"

Id. at 511.

98

101 Id
102
103

id
id
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The court agreed with Stepping Stone on the issue of ambiguity, as
Agreement II "[did] not clearly indicate which party [was] responsible for
payment of [the disputed monies]." 1' Such incomplete drafting made the
contract ambiguous, and precluded the court from aplying its plain language.
Instead, the court opted to interpret the contract.1 0 In order to interpret the
contract, the court looked to Agreement I, which unambiguously provided that
DHHR would cover Joseph G.'s health care expenses until adulthood, and
briefly discussed the equitable concerns that In re Joseph G. presented, noting
in particular that Joseph G. had no other means of financial support after
November 1, 2001.o6

DHHR held the legal high ground in In re Joseph G. Agreement II
assigned responsibility for specific costs to DHHR, but did not specify or even
imply the assignment of health care costs to DHHR.107 Indeed, Agreement I
specifically assigned Joseph G.'s per diem and health care costs to DHHR, and
it is unlikely that the parties would have simply forgotten to address those same
costs in Agreement II. However, the court cited Agreement I as evidence that
the parties intended to assign responsibility for Joseph G.'s health care costs to
DHHR. 08 The court made no attempt to explain or justify the transfer of
obligations from one old, ineffective agreement to a new agreement when there
was no evidence (parol or otherwise) to indicate that such a resuscitation of
extinguished obligations reflected the parties' mutual intent.
In re Joseph G. appears to be a case tailor-made for the admission of
parol evidence; yet notably absent from the court's analysis was any reference
to discussions (or the absence of discussions) that DHHR and Stepping Stone
had when drafting Agreement II. No evidence was presented regarding whether
the parties discussed and dismissed the subject of who would bear Joseph G.'s
health care costs. Nonetheless, a unanimous court assigned responsibility for
paying the costs to DHHR.
Equity, it appears, played the dominant role in the resolution of the
disputed terms in both Aycoth and Joseph G. 109 In each case, the court strained

Id. at 512.
Id
106 Id. ("[A] non-medically eligible child, namely Joseph,
was, in fact, housed at Stepping
Stone while Agreement II was in force and effect . . [and] some party is responsible either for
paying for the [services] ... or for absorbing such costs." To charge Stepping Stone the costs
would be unjust and inequitable, as "no other placement plan [for Joseph G.] had been devised,
much less implemented.").
107
Id. at 510.
'"

105

Id. at 512.
See id.; Jessee v. Aycoth, 503 S.E.2d 528 (W. Va. 1998). While we do not know
specifically what equitable concerns were at issue in Aycoth, Justice Workman's dissent refers to
10

'
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to find ambiguity, which was resolved in a manner that the court deemed just.
While a discussion of judicial restraint is beyond the scope of this article, in the
wake of Aycoth and Joseph G., parties to written agreements governed by West
Virginia law may now wonder whether they are agreeing to the terms set forth
within the document's four corners, or the terms a court may later determine
are equitable.
V. AMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS: WHEN EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE CONTRADICTS THE
TERMS OF AN AMBIGUOUS CONTRACT, THE QUESTION OF THE PARTIES'
INTENT IS A MATTER OF FACT FOR THE JURY

When the terms of a contract are ambiguous and are contradicted by
extrinsic evidence, a court should deem the evidence admissible and send the
question of the parties' intent to the jury to resolve as a matter of fact."o There
is surprisingly little case law in this area of West Virginia's jurisprudence,
because courts appear to be prone to resolving ambiguity as a matter of law
rather than as a matter of fact. Nonetheless, two relatively recent cases provide
illustrations of ambiguous written agreements that were resolved as a matter of
fact.
Stump v. Cunningham: Conflicting ParolEvidence Regardingan
Employee's Commission on Sales of Cemetery Plots Raised Questions
of Factfor a Jury

A.

In Stump v. Cunningham,' an independent contractor (Stump) was
hired via written agreement by cemetery owners (the Smiths) to sell cemetery
plots.112 Stump was granted the exclusive right to sell "pre-need" cemetery
plots in exchange for a commission." 3 The agreement also gave Stump an
exclusive option to purchase the cemetery and its assets, in the event the Smiths
chose to sell.11 4 In 1985, the Smiths offered to sell the cemetery to Stump." 5

the court's efforts to reach a "fairer" result through the finding and resolution of ambiguity.
Aycoth, 503 S.E.2d at 533 (Workman, J., dissenting).
110 See Stewart v. Blackwood Elec. Steel Corp., 130 S.E. 447, 449 (W. Va. 1925) ("[W]here
the written contract is ambiguous and uncertain, parol evidence is admissible . . .. [Where] the
parol evidence be not in conflict, the duty remains with the court to construe the writing;
otherwise, it becomes a jury question under proper instructions.") (referencing Watson v.
Buckhannon River Coal Co., 120 S.E. 390 (W. Va. 1923)); see also Fraternal Order of Police v.
City of Fairmont, 468 S.E.2d 712, 717 n.7 (W. Va. 1996) (concluding that when ambiguity exists
in a contract, resolution will turn on the parties' intent).
"'
419 S.E.2d 699 (W. Va. 1992).
112

Id. at 702.

113

id.

114

id.
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Stump rejected the Smiths' terms but sent a letter that reserved his right to
make a counteroffer."' 6 The letter also informed the Smiths that Stump
"claimed over $77,000 in commissions were due him under the pre-need sales
[contract]."" 7 In April 1986, the Smiths sold the cemetery to a third party buyer
(Rowe).' 8 Subsequently, Stump filed suit, claiming that the Smiths had failed
to honor (1) his exclusive right to sell pre-need cemetery plots by failing to pay
his commission, and (2) his exclusive option to purchase the cemetery by
refusing his purported acceptance of the 1986 offer and selling the cemetery to
Rowe." 9 At trial, the jury found for Stump on both counts.120 The Smiths

appealed.121
The Smiths argued that the agreement covering Stump's commissions
was not ambiguous, and that the question of whether Stump was entitled to a
commission on sales to walk-in customers should not have been sent to a
jury. 122 The issue raised by the Smiths on appeal was whether walk-in
customers who purchased cemetery plots qualified as "pre-need" customers
(i.e., customers on which Stump had the right to receive commission).123 The
Smiths cited provisions of the agreement which stated explicitly that sales to
customers "previously solicited by Mr. Stump will be deemed to be sales by
Mr. Stump." 24 According to the Smiths, this language clearly indicated that
unless Stump had previously solicited a walk-in customer, he would not receive
a commission on the sale to that customer.12 5
The evidence at trial was contradictory.126 Both parties claimed that
they had parol evidence that supported their interpretation of the commission
term in the contract, and both parties presented extensive and conflicting parol
evidence at trial.127 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reiterated
its assertion that when a contract is ambiguous, parol evidence is generally
admissible "to show the situation of the parties, the surrounding circumstances
when the writing was made, and the practical construction given to the contract
Id.

115
116

Id.

117

Id.

"'

Id. at 703.

"

Id.

120

id.
id

121
122

Id at 707-08.

123

Id at 707.
id
id

124
125
126
127

id
id
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by the parties themselves either contemporaneously or subsequently."l 28 When
parol evidence is conflicting on a material point, responsibility for interpreting
the agreement's meaning should be delegated to the jury.129 Applying this rule,
the court determined that the contract at issue was ambiguous in that it failed to
specify a material term (Stump's commission).13 0 Further, the court concluded
that because each party had presented conflicting and contradictory parol
evidence regarding that term, the trial court properly delegated responsibility
for resolving the ambiguity to the jury.' 3 ' The verdict against the Smiths was
therefore upheld.
Ambiguous Contracts: Conflicting ParolEvidence Regardingan
Adult's Status as a Member ofAnother Adult's "Household"Raised
Questions of Factfor a Jury

B.

In Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tucker,13 2 the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia reviewed a bizarre set of circumstances in which an
injured plaintiff and an insurance company disputed the meaning of the word
"household." On July 25, 1996, plaintiff-appellant John Tucker (Tucker) drove
to a farm owned by defendant-appellee Locie Taylor (Locie), intending to
purchase livestock. 1 3 Two mobile homes were situated approximately 50 to
100 yards apart on Locie's farm, one in which Locie resided and one in which
Locie's son, Darrell Lee Taylor (Darrell), lived.134
Darrell, age 38, had drunk excessively earlier in the day, and had
passed out while cooking on his stove.'35 The stove caught fire just as Tucker
approached Darrell's residence.' 36 Tucker noticed smoke coming from inside
the mobile home and knocked on the door, waking Darrell.137 Tucker did not
hear Darrell inside and kicked in the mobile home's door, intending to rescue
any stranded occupants.138 As Tucker entered the mobile home, Darrell threw

128

Id. (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 120 S.E. 390 (W. Va.

1923)).
129
id
130

id.

131

id.
576 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va. 1992).

132

136

Id. at 264.
id.
id.
id.

138

id

3
134
135
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the flaming grease into the doorway that Tucker had just breached, severely
injuring him.139
Tucker filed suit against Darrell, Locie, and Locie's insurer (Farmers
Mutual).14 0 Darrell admitted fault, but Farmers Mutual argued that Darrell's tort
was not covered by Locie's policy.141 Locie's policy with Farmers Mutual
provided coverage for "all sums for which an insured is liable by law because
of bodily injury[.]"l 42 The policy defined "'insured' to include 'you,' meaning
the person ... named on the Declarations" (Locie), and "your relatives if
residents of your household." 43 Farmers Mutual moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that its agreement with Locie was clear, and under its clear
terms, Darrell did not qualify as a member of Locie's "household."'" The trial
judge granted Farmers Mutual's motion, and Tucker appealed.14 5
At issue on appeal was whether Darrell qualified as a member of
Locie's household.14 6 Farmers Mutual argued that the term "household" is "a
clear, well-defined term, and not subject to a broad construction." 4 7 When the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia previously analyzed the scope and
meaning of that term, it determined that relatives of an insured living in a house
owned by the insured-but paying their own bills and taxes-were not
members of the same household.1 4 8 Darrell's unique situation, however, forced
the court to reevaluate its previous analysis of "household," as Darrell was
dependent on Locie for financial support.149 Thus, Tucker argued that because
Darrell's situation could be distinguished from previous cases in which the
court analyzed the word "household," his tort fell within the scope of the
agreement's coverage.15 0
The court stated that the "determination of whether a person is a
resident of a particular household is an elastic concept" and is usually a

139
140

Id.
id

Id. (Farmers Mutual agreed to liability coverage for any of Locie's relatives if the relatives
lived in his household).
141

142
143
'

145
'4

Id. at 265 (alteration in original).

d
Id. at 263.

d
Id. at 265.

Id. (specifically arguing that "household" means a group of persons living under the same
roof, "not those living in separate abodes").
148
Id. (citing Spangler v. Armstrong, 499 S.E.2d 865 (W. Va. 1997)).
147

149

Id. at 270.

"so

Id. at 265.
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question of fact for a jury.' 5 1 Moreover, the term "household" was not defined
in Locie's Farmers Mutual policy, and "[t]he parties . .. [were] able to give the
policy language differing but equally reasonable constructions."' 5 2 The
language, therefore, was ambiguous. 53
In order to resolve the ambiguity, the court set forth a five-factor test to
determine whether a person is a member of an insured's household.15 4 The
court then stated that because the question of whether a person is a member of
an insured's household typically turns on intent, the question should be
resolved by a jury as a matter of fact.' 55 Thus, the court reversed and remanded
the case for further proceedings.1 56
VII. SUMMARY
An author willing to make a decisive, sweeping statement about the
law regarding the resolution of ambiguous written agreements in West Virginia
is bolder than this one. Nevertheless, the common law "rules" we have
reviewed are clear enough:

151

Id

*

In West Virginia, courts will hold parties to the terms set
forth in written agreements if those terms are clear and
unambiguous. (Section I)

*

When a plain error or patent ambiguity exists within a
written agreement, West Virginia courts may, in contrast
with most other jurisdictions, allow the admission of parol
evidence to help resolve the ambiguity. (Section II)

*

When ambiguity is less apparent, or latent, courts will
generally allow for the admission of extrinsic evidence to

at 270.

152 id.
154

id.
These factors include, but are not limited to, (1) the intent of the parties, (2)
the formality of the relationship between the person in question and the other
members of the named insured's household, (3) the permanence or transient
nature of that person's residence therein, (4) the absence or existence of
another place of lodging for that person, and (5) the age and self-sufficiency
of that person.

Id.
15

Id

156id
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help resolve the offending terms of the agreement.
(Section II)
*

When the extrinsic evidence merely completes or
supplements the ambiguous term, courts will resolve the
matter as a question of law. (Section III)

*

When, however, the extrinsic evidence contradicts the
terms of a written agreement, the court should delegate the
matter to a jury to resolve as a question of fact. (Section
IV)

The application of those rules in this jurisdiction has, however, been
somewhat inconsistent. The Joseph G. and Aycoth cases described in Section
IV each involved ambiguous terms of written agreements that raised questions
of fact appropriate for resolution by a jury. The extrinsic facts at issue in those
cases-much like Stump and Farmer'sMutual described in Section V-clearly
raised questions of credibility appropriate for resolution by a jury.
Nonetheless, in Joseph G. and Aycoth, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia determined that the extrinsic facts at issue did not contradict the terms
of the disputed written agreements. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia's sense of equity may, to some extent, explain the discrepancy.
However, while the end result in Joseph G. and Aycoth may, in the Court's
view, have been equitable, parties to any written agreement subject to West
Virginia law may now wonder whether they are agreeing to the terms they
intend to be bound to, or the terms a court may later determine to be fair.
In any event, an attorney called upon to represent a party in a case
involving an allegedly or potentially ambiguous written agreement must
carefully navigate the labyrinth (perhaps "minefield" is a better analogy) by
weighing the evidence supporting and undermining her client's position, and
applying one or more of the principles described above to persuade the court to
allow the favorable evidence in or to keep the unfavorable evidence out.
Navigating that legal landscape could, of course, prove hazardous and costly to
an individual who has unwittingly executed an agreement that includes a vague,
incomplete, or inconsistent term. Drafters should therefore make every effort to
predict potential sources of ambiguity-to see around the corner, so to speakand replace any potentially ambiguous verbiage with language that precisely,
clearly, and comprehensively describes each party's intent.
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